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We develop an asset pricing model with stochastic transaction costs and investors with
heterogeneous horizons. Depending on their horizon, investors hold different sets of assets in
equilibrium. This generates segmentation and spillover effects for expected returns, where the
liquidity (risk) premium of illiquid assets is determined by investor horizons and the correlation
between liquid and illiquid asset returns. We estimate our model for the cross-section of U.S.
stock returns and find that it generates a good fit, mainly due to a combination of a substantial
expected liquidity premium and segmentation effects, while the liquidity risk premium is small.
I. Introduction
The investment horizon, and the associated demand for liquidity, is a key dimension on
which investors differ, with high-frequency traders and pension funds being at opposite ends of
the spectrum. Much of the literature that explores the impact of horizon on portfolio choice and
asset pricing derives from Merton (1971), which focuses on the intertemporal hedging demands
of long-term investors. The interaction of investment horizon and liquidity has received much less
attention. This is surprising given that the impact of transaction costs and other trading frictions
on portfolio performance depends heavily on the level of trading activity, which has a close
relation with the investor’s horizon.
We derive a new liquidity-based asset pricing model featuring risk-averse investors with
heterogeneous investment horizons and stochastic transaction costs. Investors with longer
investment horizons are less concerned about trading costs because they do not necessarily trade
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every period. Our model generates a number of new implications for the pricing of liquidity that
we test empirically on the cross-section of U.S. stock returns.
Previous theories of liquidity and asset pricing have largely ignored heterogeneity in
investor horizons, with the exception of the seminal paper of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who
study a setting where risk-neutral investors have heterogeneous horizons. Their model generates
clientele effects: short-term investors hold the liquid assets and long-term investors hold the
illiquid assets, which leads to a concave relation between transaction costs and expected returns.1
Besides risk-neutrality, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) assume that transaction costs are constant.
However, there is much empirical evidence that liquidity is time-varying. Assuming stochastic
transaction costs, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) set out one of the most influential asset pricing
models with liquidity risk, where various liquidity risk premiums are generated. The model
includes homogeneous investors with a one-period horizon and thus implies a linear (as opposed
to concave) relation between expected transaction costs and expected returns. Our paper bridges
these two studies. It combines heterogeneous horizons, as in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), with
stochastic illiquidity and risk aversion, as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). This leads to a
number of novel and important implications for the impact of both expected liquidity and
liquidity risk on asset prices.
Our model setup is easily described. We have multiple assets with i.i.d. dividends and
stochastic transaction costs, and many investor types with mean-variance utility over terminal
1Hopenhayn and Werner (1996) propose a similar set-up featuring risk-neutral investors with heterogeneity in
impatience and endogenously determined liquidity effects.
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wealth but different investment horizons. We obtain a unique stationary equilibrium in an
overlapping generations setting and we solve for expected returns in closed form, where expected
returns reflect a liquidity premium component and a risk premium component.
We show that, depending on the input parameters, investors with different horizons may
choose to invest in different sets of assets in equilibrium (”endogenous segmentation”). For
example, short-term investors may optimally choose not to invest in the most illiquid assets
because their expected returns are not sufficient to cover expected transaction costs. In contrast,
long-term investors trade less frequently and can afford to invest in illiquid assets. This clientele
partition is more general than in Amihud and Mendelson (1986): since our investors are risk
averse, they also consider the risk-return and diversification aspects of an asset when choosing
their investments. We show that, depending on the input parameters, either all investors hold all
assets in equilibrium (”integration”), some investors hold only a subset of assets (”partial
segmentation”), or investors with different horizons hold non-overlapping portfolios (”full
segmentation”).
Using various examples, we show the implications of our equilibrium model for expected
returns. For integrated assets, which are held by all investors, expected returns contain the
familiar compensation for expected transaction costs and a mixture of a liquidity risk premium
and standard-CAPM risk premium. Since long-term investors care less about liquidity risk, the
size of the liquidity risk premium depends on the risk-bearing capacity of long-term versus
short-term investors. Furthermore, the effect of expected liquidity is also smaller, given that
long-horizon investors do not trade every period.
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The expected returns of segmented assets, which are not held by all investors, contain
additional terms. More specifically, there are segmentation and spillover effects. The
segmentation risk premium is positive and is caused by imperfect risk sharing, since not all
investors hold these assets. The spillover risk premium can be positive or negative, depending on
the correlation between segmented and integrated asset returns. For example, if a segmented asset
is highly correlated with integrated assets, the spillover effect is negative and neutralizes the
segmentation risk premium, because in this case the segmented asset can be replicated (almost
exactly) by a portfolio of integrated assets.
The expected liquidity term also contains a segmentation effect, in that the expected
liquidity premium reflects the horizon of the investors that hold these assets. Along the same lines
as the risk premium, it also contains a spillover term, with a sign that is a function of the
correlation between integrated and segmented asset returns.
In summary, our model demonstrates that incorporating heterogeneous investment
horizons has a considerable impact on the way liquidity affects asset prices. It changes the relative
size of liquidity and market risk premiums, leads to cross-sectional differences in liquidity effects,
and generates segmentation and spillover effects. While our model is not designed to realistically
match observed moments of the holding periods of investors, it can provide a better intuition
about the effects of heterogeneous investment horizons on expected returns.
Armed with this array of novel theoretical predictions, we take the model to the data to
test its empirical relevance. Specifically, we analyze the cross-section of U.S. stocks over the
period 1964 to 2009 and use the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) to proxy for liquidity costs,
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as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). We estimate our asset pricing model using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) and find that a version with two horizons (one month and ten years)
generates a good cross-sectional fit of expected stock returns. Specifically, for 25 liquidity-sorted
portfolios, the heterogeneous-horizon model generates a cross-sectional R2 of 72.6% compared to
26.6% for the non-nested Acharya-Pedersen model. The improvement in R2 is thus substantial,
and a model comparison test shows that this improvement is marginally statistically significant.
We thus conclude, with moderate confidence, that our structural model generates a fit that is better
than the Acharya-Pedersen model, while imposing more economic structure on the composition
of the risk premium and the expected liquidity premium. As an upshot of our richer model, the
empirical estimates can also be used to make inferences about the risk-bearing capacity of
investors in each horizon class.
This estimated equilibrium exhibits a substantial degree of segmentation. In equilibrium,
short-term investors only hold the more liquid stock portfolios, while long-term investors hold
less liquid stocks. Stocks with intermediate liquidity levels are held by both investors. This leads
to sizable segmentation effects on expected returns. In addition, despite the small overlap
between the portfolios of short-term and long-term investors, there are substantial spillover effects
in the liquidity and risk premiums because the portfolio returns are highly correlated.
A key implication of our estimated model is that expected liquidity is much more
important, and liquidity risk is much less important, than in previous studies. Taking account of
the heterogeneity of investor horizons, we find an expected liquidity premium, averaged across all
25 liquidity sorted portfolios, of 4.58% per year. This compares with a figure of 0.73% in the
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homogeneous horizon model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). While much of the literature
which assumes investor homogeneity has found substantial liquidity risk premiums (Pa´stor and
Stambaugh, 2003, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Sadka, 2006), our estimates imply a liquidity risk
premium of only 0.02% per annum. We also find that the fit of the model is barely changed if we
ignore liquidity risk altogether. Hence, once we allow for heterogeneous horizons and endogenous
segmentation, a liquidity risk premium is not needed to fit the U.S. cross-section of stock returns.
In the final part of the paper, we develop an extended version of the theoretical model that
generates time variation in the liquidity premium, by allowing for regime switches in transaction
costs. In this extended model the degree of segmentation can also vary across regimes. Using
some approximations, we again obtain analytically tractable asset pricing equations, in this case
for the expected returns in each regime. We first estimate the regime-switching model for
transaction costs and then estimate the regime-dependent model for expected returns. We again
find a large expected liquidity component in this model, which is higher in the illiquid regime. We
also find that short-term investors exhibit a flight-to-liquidity effect, that is, they endogenously
choose to only invest in the most liquid assets in the illiquid regime, while investing in a wider set
of assets in the liquid regime.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the relevant
literature. Section III presents the liquidity asset pricing model. We set out our estimation
methodology and describe the data in Section IV. Section V presents our empirical findings. In
Section VI we extend the model to a setting with persistent transaction costs, and estimate this
extended model. We conclude with a summary of our results in Section VII.
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II. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on liquidity and asset pricing along several
dimensions. First, our model is related to theoretical work on portfolio choice and illiquidity (see
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen, 2006, for an overview). Starting with the work by
Constantinides (1986), several researchers have examined multi-period portfolio choice in the
presence of transaction costs. In contrast to these papers, we focus on a general equilibrium
setting with heterogeneous investment horizons in the presence of liquidity risk. We obtain a
tractable asset pricing model by simplifying the analysis in other dimensions. In particular, we
assume no intermediate rebalancing for long-term investors.
Second, our empirical results contribute to a rich literature that has empirically studied the
asset pricing implications of liquidity and liquidity risk. Amihud (2002) finds that stock returns
are increasing in illiquidity both in the cross-section and in the time-series. Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) show that the sensitivity of stock returns to aggregate liquidity is priced. Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) integrate these effects into a liquidity-adjusted CAPM that performs better
empirically than the standard CAPM. In the liquidity-adjusted CAPM the expected return on a
security increases with the level of illiquidity and is influenced by three different liquidity risk
covariances. Several articles build on these seminal papers and document the pricing of liquidity
and liquidity risk in various asset classes.2 However, none of these papers study the liquidity
2For example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) focus on emerging markets, Sadka (2010) studies hedge
funds, Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012) focus on private equity, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) study corporate
bonds, and Bongaerts, De Jong, and Driessen (2011) focus on credit default swaps.
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effects with heterogeneous investment horizons.
Third, our paper is also related to empirical research showing the relation between
liquidity and investors’ holding periods. For example, Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) find evidence
that it is not the spread, but the amortized spread that is more relevant as a measure of transaction
costs, as it takes into account the length of investors’ holding periods. Cremers and Pareek (2009)
study how investment horizons of institutional investors affect market efficiency. Cella, Ellul, and
Giannetti (2013) demonstrate that investors’ short horizons amplify the effects of market-wide
negative shocks. All of these articles use turnover data for stocks and investors to capture
investment horizons. In contrast, we estimate the degree of heterogeneity in investment horizons
by fitting our asset pricing model to the cross-section of U.S. stock returns.
In their study of investors on the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1992-2003, Næs
and Ødegaard (2009) show that holding periods do vary widely both by investor type (classified as
financial, corporate, private, state, or foreign) and by stock liquidity (as measured by the bid-ask
spread). Yan and Zhang (2009) compare the investment strategies of institutional investors on the
NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq over the period 1979-2003. They classify institutions into long-term
and short-term by looking at their trading turnover over the past four quarters. They find that,
although both short- and long-term institutions prefer stocks with higher turnover, short-term
institutions have a much stronger preference for high turnover stocks. They interpret this as
evidence that short-term institutions care more about liquidity than do long-term institutions.
A more specific result is obtained by Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014), who
show for a sample of NASDAQ and NYSE stocks that some 42% of dollar volume in large stocks
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is due to high-frequency traders (HFTs) and only 11% of dollar volume in small stocks is due to
HFTs. This also indicates a short-term investor preference for large, liquid stocks. Chen, Huang,
Sun, Yao, and Yu (2018) focus on holdings of insurance companies in the corporate bond market
and also provide evidence for segmentation based on horizon and liquidity. They find that insurers
with longer effective horizons tend to hold less liquid bonds. In addition, they find that the
liquidity premium in corporate bonds is higher when bonds are held by investors with a stronger
preference for liquidity (investors with a shorter horizon).
Fourth, our modeling approach is related to recent theories where some investors do not
trade every period, although in these theories there is no explicit role for transaction costs and
illiquidity. For example, Duffie (2010) studies an equilibrium pricing model in a setting where
some “inattentive” investors do not trade every period. He uses this setup to study how supply
shocks affect price dynamics in a single-asset model. In contrast, besides incorporating
transaction costs, our focus is mostly on the cross-section of expected returns. Similarly, Brennan
and Zhang (2018) develop an asset pricing model where a representative agent has a stochastic
horizon.3 However, liquidity effects are not incorporated and investors are homogeneous, in that
they hold the same assets and those assets are liquidated simultaneously. In their model, horizon
is important because it interacts with securities’ risk characteristics. A security’s market beta is
allowed to depend on the horizon over which the returns are measured. The model is fitted to the
distribution of returns over different horizons. The information in the term structure of beta plays
3Using a similar motivation, Kamara, Korajczyk, Lou, and Sadka (2016) study empirically how the horizon that is
used to calculate returns matters for the pricing of various risk factors.
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a vital role in fitting the model. In our model, the horizon of the investor is important only insofar
as it interacts with transaction costs, and there are no horizon effects in betas.
Fifth, our model extension with regime switches for transaction costs is related to work by
Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013). Watanabe and
Watanabe (2008) find evidence for regime switches in liquidity risk exposure for stocks, with
higher liquidity risk in bad times. They also show that the liquidity risk premium is much higher
in this bad state of the world. Acharya et al. (2013) show, for corporate bonds and stocks, that
exposure to liquidity risk varies across regimes, where in a stress regime junk bonds and high
book-to-market stocks have higher liquidity risk.
Finally, our work relates to the literature on segmentation in international equity markets,
see Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a survey. For example, Errunza and Losq (1985) derive an asset
pricing model where some investors only have access to a subset of all financial assets, which is
what we refer to as partial segmentation. We extend their model by endogenizing the degree of
segmentation, and, most importantly, by introducing illiquidity into the model.
III. The Model
A. Model Setup and Assumptions
Our liquidity asset pricing model features both stochastic liquidity and heterogeneous
investment horizons in a multiple asset setting. We develop a theoretical framework that is also
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suitable for empirical estimation. Our model is built on the following assumptions that we
partially relax later in an extension.
• Assumption 1: There are K assets, with asset i paying a dividend Di,t each period which is
added to the risk-free deposit. Selling the asset costs Ci,t . Transaction costs and dividends
are i.i.d. to obtain a stationary equilibrium, and are allowed to be correlated. There is a
fixed supply of each asset, equal to Si shares, and a risk-free asset with exogenous and
constant return R f . Short selling of assets is not allowed.
• Assumption 2: We have N classes of investors with horizon h j, where j = 1, ..,N. To
simplify expressions we focus on two classes of investors in the main text, short-term and
long-term investors with horizons h1 and h2, respectively. Internet Appendix I.A solves the
model for any N.
• Assumption 3: Investors have mean-variance utility over terminal wealth with risk aversion
A j for investor type j.
• Assumption 4: We have an overlapping generations (OLG) setup. Each period, a fixed
quantity Q j > 0 of type j investors enters the market and invests in some or all of the K
assets.
• Assumption 5: Investors with horizon h j only trade when they enter the market and at their
terminal date, hence they do not rebalance their portfolio at intermediate dates.
Most assumptions follow from Acharya and Pedersen (2005).4 In particular, the means,
4Acharya and Pedersen (2005) start with investors with exponential utility and normally distributed dividends and
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variances and covariances of dividends and transaction costs are assumed to be exogenously
given. The key extension is that we allow for heterogeneous horizons, while Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) only feature one-period investors. We make two simplifying assumptions to
obtain tractable solutions. First, we assume i.i.d. dividends and transaction costs to obtain a
stationary equilibrium. In Section VI, we relax this assumption and derive an equilibrium with
persistent transaction costs. The second simplifying assumption is that investors do not rebalance
at intermediate dates. This assumption is important mainly for long-term investors. Note that the
incentive on long-term investors to rebalance their portfolios frequently is limited by the presence
of transaction costs. This is especially the case when, as in our benchmark model, returns are i.i.d.
(see, for example, Constantinides, 1986). Time-varying expected returns and volatility would
probably generate a stronger preference for intermediate trading.
With i.i.d. dividends and costs, given a fixed asset supply, a wealth-independent optimal
mean-variance demand, and with the same type of investors entering the market each period, we
obtain a unique stationary equilibrium where the price of each asset Pi,t is constant over time. We
now discuss this equilibrium in more detail.
B. Equilibrium Expected Returns
At time t, Q j investors with horizon h j enter the market and solve a maximization problem
where they choose the quantity of stocks purchased y j,t (a vector with one element for each asset)
costs, which corresponds to our assumption of mean-variance preferences.
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to maximize utility over their holding period return, taking into account the incurred transaction
costs and short-sale constraints:
max
y j,t
Et
[
Wj,t+h j
]− 1
2
A jVart
(
Wj,t+h j
)
, s.t. y j,t ≥ 0(1)
Wj,t+h j =
(
Pt+h j +
h j
∑
k=1
Rh j−kf Dt+k−Ct+h j
)′
y j,t +R
h j
f
(
e j−P′t y j,t
)
,
where R f is the gross risk-free rate, Wj,t+h j is wealth of the h j investors at time t+h j, Pt is the
K×1 vector of prices, and e j is the endowment of the h j investors. Due to the presence of
transaction costs, the optimal portfolio choice of some investors may reflect what we call
endogenous segmentation. This is the possibility that some classes of investors choose not to hold
some assets in equilibrium, for example because the associated trading costs are too high relative
to the equilibrium expected return over the investment horizon.5
In the remainder of the text of the paper, we set R f = 1 to simplify the exposition. Internet
Appendix I.A derives the model for any value of R f , which leads to very similar expressions. In
the empirical analysis, we set R f equal to the historical average of the risk-free rate.
Given the demands in equation (1), at any point in time the market clears with new
investors buying the supply of stocks minus the amount still held by the investors that entered the
5In some cases, it could happen that some investors would want to short sell liquid assets if the costs of short selling
are not too high. For simplicity we assume short selling is not possible. Bongaerts et al. (2011) derive a liquidity asset
pricing model which incorporates short selling. In Internet Appendix I.B we discuss in more detail how to arrive at an
extension that does allow for short selling.
13
market at an earlier point in time,
(2) Q1y1,t +Q2y2,t = S−
h1−1
∑
k=1
Q1y1,t−k−
h2−1
∑
k=1
Q2y2,t−k,
where S is the vector with supply of assets (in number of shares of each of the assets).
Given the i.i.d. setting, mean-variance preferences and constant supply, we look for a
stationary equilibrium in which prices and demands are constant over time and returns are i.i.d.
We can thus rewrite equation (2) as h1Q1y1+h2Q2y2 = S, where h jQ j is the total number of
type- j investors present at any point in time. An equilibrium is given by a set of prices (or,
equivalently, expected returns) such that the optimal demand of all investors given these prices
(equation (1)) satisfies the market clearing condition in equation (2). In Internet Appendix I.A we
provide the proof for the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: Given Assumptions 1-5, a unique stationary equilibrium exists. The optimal
demands y1 and y2 can be obtained by solving the following quadratic programming problem:
max
y1,y2
Q1y′1
(
E
[
Z1,t+h1
]− 1
2
A1Var(Z1,t+h1)y1
)
+Q2y′2
(
E
[
Z2,t+h2
]− 1
2
A2Var(Z2,t+h2)y2
)
(3)
s.t. h1Q1y1+h2Q2y2 = S, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0,
with
(4) Z j,t+h j =
h j
∑
k=1
Dt+k−Ct+h j .
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Proposition 1 shows how the demand equations of both investors and market clearing can
be rewritten into a single quadratic programming problem, which is easily solved using standard
optimization procedures. In Internet Appendix Section I.A we also show how to rewrite
Proposition 1 into asset returns and percentage transaction costs, which is useful for the empirical
implementation in Section IV and Section V.
Even though, in general, the quadratic program has to be solved numerically, we are able
to characterize the equilibrium expected returns analytically. We first define Rt+1 as the K×1
vector of gross asset returns, with Ri,t+1 = (Di,t+1+Pi,t+1)/Pi,t , and ct+1 the K×1 vector of
percentage costs, with ci,t =Ci,t/Pi,t . We then use a result of De Roon, Nijman, and Werker
(2001), who show that the solution to a utility maximization problem with short-sales constraints
can be rewritten as the usual mean-variance solution for the subset of assets for which the
short-sales constraint turns out not to be binding. This implies that, given equilibrium prices and
expected returns, the optimal demand derived in Proposition 1 can be written as follows (see
Internet Appendix I.A):
(5) y j =
1
A j
diag(P)−1 Var
(
h j
∑
k=1
Rt+k− ct+h j
)−1
y j>0,p
(
h jE [Rt+1−1]−E [ct+1]
)
,
where, for a generic K×K matrix M, we introduce the notation My j>0 to indicate the matrix
containing only the rows and columns of M corresponding to the strictly positive elements of y j.
We write M−1y j>0,p for the inverse of My j>0 with zeros inserted at the locations where rows and
columns of M were removed. With this convention, Var
(
∑
h j
k=1 Rt+k− ct+h j
)−1
y j>0,p
corresponds to
the K×K matrix containing the inverse of the covariance matrix of the set of assets that type- j
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investors hold in equilibrium, with zeros inserted for the rows and columns that were not included
(the assets that investors j does not hold in equilibrium). The optimal demand vector y j thus
contains zeros for those assets in which investor j does not invest, as it should.6
We can then fill in the demand in equation (5) in the market clearing equation and solve
for the equilibrium expected returns. We define Rmt = S˜
′Rt/S˜′ι and cmt = S˜′ct/S˜′ι, where
S˜ = diag(P)S denotes the dollar supply of assets. Internet Appendix I.A then shows that under the
stated assumptions we obtain the following result:
PROPOSITION 2: For the unique stationary equilibrium described in Proposition 1, the
equilibrium expected returns equal
E [Rt+1−1] = (γ1h1V1+ γ2h2V2)−1 (γ1V1+ γ2V2)E [ct+1](6)
+(γ1h1V1+ γ2h2V2)−1 Cov
(
Rt+1− ct+1,Rmt+1− cmt+1
)
,
where γ j = Q j/(A jS˜′ι), and
(7) Vj = h jVar(Rt+1− ct+1)Var
(
h j
∑
k=1
Rt+k− ct+h j
)−1
y j>0,p
.
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium expected returns contain two components. The
first component is a compensation for expected transaction costs. The second component is a
compensation for market risk and liquidity risk. Note that the loadings on expected costs and
6Given that returns and percentage costs are i.i.d. in equilibrium, there is no need to condition the expectations and
variances on the information set at time t.
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return covariances are matrices. This is in contrast to standard linear asset pricing models, where
these loadings are scalars which results in all assets having the same exposure to expected costs
and the return covariance.
In the equilibrium equation (6) the parameter γ j is related to the risk-bearing capacity of
the h j−investors. As mentioned above, in every period the total number of h j-investors in the
market is equal to h jQ j, which determines among how many h j-investors the risky assets can be
shared. Their risk aversion A j is also important, because it determines the size of the position
these investors are willing to take in the risky assets. Therefore, we can indeed interpret the
quantity
(8) h jγ j =
h jQ j
A j
1
S˜′ι
as the risk-bearing capacity of the h j-investors scaled by the total market capitalization. Finally,
we note that Var
(
∑
h j
k=1 Rt+k− ct+h j
)−1
y j>0,p
depends on the optimal demands derived in
Proposition 1, in particular on which assets the investor chooses to hold in equilibrium. In
practice, we thus first solve the quadratic program in Proposition 1 and then calculate equilibrium
expected returns using Proposition 2.
C. Segmentation versus Integration
In this section we expand and draw out the implications of our results, notably
Proposition 2, by looking at some simplified versions of the model. In particular, we contrast
17
integrated assets, which are held by both investors, with segmented assets, which are held by only
one investor type. In Section V, where we take the model to the data, we do of course use the
fully general model.
We focus on the case where transaction costs are fixed. In the empirical section we show
that liquidity risk does not play an important role in our sample. We also assume two classes of
investors, with h1 < h2, and we set the risk free rate R f −1 to zero in these examples.
Proposition 2 simplifies considerably in the case of complete segmentation – the case
where every asset k is held in its entirety by either investor 1 or investor 2, but not by both. Using
equation (5) and constant transaction costs, it directly follows that
(9) yk, j > 0⇒ E
[
Rk,t+1−1
]
=
1
h j
ck +
1
γ jh j
Cov
(
Rk,t+1,R
j
t+1
)
where R j is the return on investor j’s portfolio.7 This has a simple interpretation: to be held by
investor j, the expected return on the asset must be sufficient to compensate both for its amortized
transaction cost and its marginal contribution to the risk of the investor’s portfolio. For any asset
not held by investor j the equality becomes an inequality
(10) yk, j = 0⇒ E
[
Rk,t+1−1
]≤ 1
h j
ck +
1
γ jh j
Cov
(
Rk,t+1,R
j
t+1
)
The expected return on the asset is too low to merit inclusion in investor j’s portfolio.
7More formally, let Y˜j be the dollar position in assets held by investor j in equilibrium (so Y˜j = diag(Pt)h jQ jy j)
then R jt = 1+ Y˜ ′j (Rt −1)/S˜′ι is the component of the market return attributable to investor j.
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Note that equations (9) and (10) only implicitly define the expected returns in equilibrium,
because investor j’s portfolio return R jt+1 depends on the optimal holdings of this investor in
equilibrium. In the next subsection we work out a full example of expected returns on segmented
assets.
Now equations (9) and (10) must hold for any equilibrium, and not just for a segmented
equilibrium – they are simply the first order conditions for the individual investor’s optimization
problem. That means that for any asset k held by both long and short horizon investors, we can
take a weighted average of equation (9) for j = 1 and 2. Investors collectively hold the market, so
γ1h1
(
R1t+1−1
)
+ γ2h2
(
R2t+1−1
)
= (γ1h1+ γ2h2)
(
Rmt+1−1
)
, and we get
(11) yk,1,yk,2 > 0⇒ E
[
Rk,t+1−1
]
=
γ1+ γ2
γ1h1+ γ2h2
ck +
1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
Cov
(
Rk,t+1,Rmt+1
)
.
For assets held by both classes of investor, the expected return is the sum of amortized transaction
costs and compensation for market risk. The amortization rate is a weighted average of that of the
two classes of investor.
In sum, we see that, for segmented assets, prices are based on the preferences and horizon
of the investor holding these assets (equation (9)), under the condition that indeed the other
investor is not interested in holding these assets (equation (10)). For integrated assets, the
preferences and horizons of both investors directly influence the pricing (equation (11)).
To illustrate further when we obtain segmentation or integration, we simplify the setting
even more. In the empirical section, our assets are liquidity-sorted portfolios of stocks; we find
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that they are highly correlated with each other. So consider the case where all assets are perfectly
correlated with the same return variance, and differ only in the level of transaction costs. It
directly follows then that the more liquid securities (ck < some critical level c∗) are held by
short-term investors, while the less liquid (ck > c∗) are held by long-term investors; there is
complete segmentation (except possibly the asset with c = c∗ which may be held by both types of
investor). Expected returns are concave in transaction costs
(12) E
[
Rk,t+1−1
]
=

δ− (c∗− ck)/h1 if ck ≤ c∗;
δ+(ck− c∗)/h2 if ck > c∗.
where δ and c∗ depend on the variance of returns, the supply of assets, transaction cost levels, and
the risk bearing capacity of investors. This complete segmentation is similar to what is obtained
in the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model.
Now consider the introduction into this market of an asset that has a beta of 1 against the
other assets but also has some idiosyncratic risk. Suppose it has c > c∗; if it is in infinitely small
supply, it will be held by the long-term investor alone and have an expected return of
(c− c∗)/h2+δ. The short-term investor will not want to hold it. They require a higher rate of
return of (c− c∗)/h1+δ. As the supply of the asset increases (with a corresponding decline in
the supply of other illiquid securities) the amount of the asset’s idiosyncratic risk borne by the
long-term investor rises. The long term investor’s required rate of return rises. The short-term
investor’s required rate of return does not change since they are not bearing any of the
idiosyncratic risk. If the supply of the asset is large enough, the rate of return will rise to a level
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such that the short-term investor wants to hold it as well. The market for the asset is then
integrated. Similarly, if the supply of a liquid asset with idiosyncratic risk is high enough, the
premium required by the short term investor for bearing the risk will be sufficiently high that the
long term investor will also want to hold the asset. Hence, in this case we end up with an
equilibrium where some assets are integrated while others are segmented. This is what we find
when we take the model to the data.
D. A Full Example of Partial Segmentation
In the previous section we argued that, depending on the parameters, a mix of segmented
and integrated assets can arise in equilibrium. We now provide a full example of such an
equilibrium with both integrated and segmented assets. To obtain tractable expressions, we
continue to take constant transaction costs (Var(ct+1) = 0), but do not restrict asset returns to be
perfectly correlated. Of course, our benchmark empirical estimation focuses on the unrestricted
equilibrium in equation (6).
We then focus on the case where the input parameters in Proposition 1 are such that
short-term investors choose to invest in a subset of assets only in equilibrium, while the long-term
investors optimally hold all assets. Given the constant transaction costs, this implies that V2 = I.
Without loss of generality, we also set h1 = 1 to simplify notation. This specific case is similar to
Errunza and Losq (1985), and the asset pricing expressions below thus extend Errunza and Losq
(1985) to a setting with transaction costs.
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The returns on the assets that are held by short-term investors are denoted Rliqt , and the
returns on the assets that are not held by short-term investors by Rilliqt . We also use this notation
for the costs. Internet Appendix I.C proves the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: If N = 2, h1 = 1, Var(ct+1) = 0, R f = 1, long-term investors optimally hold all
assets and short-term investors optimally hold only a subset of ”liquid” assets, then for these
“liquid” assets the expected returns are
(13) E
[
Rliqt+1−1
]
=
γ1+ γ2
γ1h1+ γ2h2
E
[
cliqt+1
]
+
1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
Cov
(
Rliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
.
The expected returns on “illiquid” assets only held by long-term investors are
E
[
Rilliqt+1−1
]
=
1
h2
E
[
cilliqt+1
]
+
h2−h1
h2
γ1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
βE
[
cliqt+1
]
(14)
+
1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
Cov
(
Rilliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
+
(
1
γ2h2
− 1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
)
Cov
(
Rilliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
−
(
1
γ2h2
− 1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
)
βCov
(
Rliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
,
where the matrix β denotes the liquidity spillover beta, defined as
(15) β= Cov
(
Rilliqt+1,R
liq
t+1
)
Var
(
Rliqt+1
)−1
.
First, we note that the equilibrium expected returns for liquid assets are identical to the
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expression given in (11), where assets are held by both short-term and long-term investors. For
the “illiquid” assets, the pricing is more complex. In what follows, we discuss separately the
different components that make up expected excess returns for illiquid assets.
We start by analyzing the expected liquidity effect that we can decompose into three parts:
(16)
γ1+ γ2
γ1h1+ γ2h2
E
[
cilliqt+1
]
+
(
1
h2
− γ1+ γ2
γ1h1+ γ2h2
)
E
[
cilliqt+1
]
+
h2−h1
h2
γ1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
βE
[
cliqt+1
]
.
The first component, which we denote full risk-sharing expected liquidity premium, is the
expected liquidity effect that one would obtain if these assets were held by both short-term and
long-term investors. The second term (segmentation expected liquidity premium) reflects the fact
that only long-term investors hold the illiquid assets; this term dampens the effect of expected
liquidity since 1h2 −
γ1+γ2
γ1h1+γ2h2 < 0. The third component (spillover expected liquidity premium)
arises from the exposure (as given by β) of the illiquid assets to the liquid assets. If this exposure
is positive, this increases the expected liquidity effect for the illiquid assets since
h2−h1
h2
γ1
γ1h1+γ2h2 > 0. In other words, if liquid and illiquid assets are positively correlated, the
expected liquidity effect on illiquid assets cannot be much lower than the effect for liquid assets,
because long-term investors would take advantage by buying the liquid assets in preference to the
illiquid assets.
We now turn to the risk premiums, where we also have a natural interpretation for each of
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the various covariance terms in the equilibrium relation for the illiquid assets. The term
(17)
1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
Cov
(
Rilliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
gives the full risk-sharing risk premium that would arise if both types of investors would hold the
asset. The second term,
(18)
(
1
γ2h2
− 1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
)
Cov
(
Rilliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
,
gives the segmentation risk premium, which shows the impact of the lower risk sharing due to
long-term investors only holding the illiquid assets. Since 1γ2h2 − 1γ1h1+γ2h2 > 0, this segmentation
premium increases expected returns in case of positive return covariance. The third term,
(19) −
(
1
γ2h2
− 1
γ1h1+ γ2h2
)
βCov
(
Rliqt+1,R
m
t+1
)
,
defines a spillover risk premium. Along the lines of the discussion above for the expected liquidity
effect, this term concerns the relative pricing of the illiquid versus liquid assets. If the returns on
liquid and illiquid assets are positively correlated, this effect reduces the segmentation effect.8
8The presence of a segmentation risk premium is in the spirit of the international asset pricing literature (e.g., De
Jong and De Roon (2005)), where segmentation also leads to additional effects on expected returns.
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IV. Empirical Methodology and Data
A. GMM Estimation
We use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology to estimate the
equilibrium conditions given by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, but without imposing R f = 1.
Empirically, we focus on a model with two horizons and we fix these horizons h1 and h2 in the
empirical analysis. Then, the parameters that remain to be estimated are γ j = Q j/(A jS˜′ι).
As discussed below, we use a cross-section of equity portfolio returns to estimate the
model. We define the vector of pricing errors of all portfolios, denoted by g(ψ,γ), as
g(ψ,γ) = E [Rt+1−1]− (γ1h1V1+ γ2h2V2)−1 (γ1V1+ γ2V2)E [ct+1](20)
− (γ1h1V1+ γ2h2V2)−1 Cov
(
Rt+1− ct+1,Rmt+1− cmt+1
)
,
where γ= (γ1,γ2)′ is the vector of parameters, and ψ is a vector containing all expected returns,
expected costs, covariances entering the Vj matrices, and the covariances with the market return.9
Concretely, in a first step, we estimate all elements of ψ by their sample moments. In a second
step, we perform a GMM estimation of γ, using an identity weighting matrix across all portfolios.
Note that the matrices V1 and V2 depend on the optimal demands y1 and y2, which in turn depend
on γ. Hence, for a given value of γ we first determine optimal demands using Proposition 1. In
9We compute the long-term covariance matrices using the i.i.d. assumption. Internet Appendix II.A provides
further details.
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Internet Appendix Section I.A we discuss in detail how we implement Proposition 1 empirically.
We then calculate equilibrium expected returns, and compare these with observed average returns.
We thus minimize the GMM goal function J, equal to the sum of squared pricing errors, over γ,
(21) min
γ
J = g(ψ̂,γ)′g(ψ̂,γ).
In Internet Appendix II.B we derive the asymptotic covariance matrix of this GMM
estimator, taking into account the estimation error in all sample moments in ψ, in line with the
approach of Shanken (1992). In this Appendix we also describe how we use a standard bootstrap
method to calculate this asymptotic covariance matrix and obtain standard errors for the relevant
parameters.
B. Data
We follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) in our data selection and construction. We use
daily stock return and volume data from CRSP from 1964 until 2009 for all common shares listed
on NYSE and AMEX. As our empirical measures of liquidity rely on volume, we do not include
Nasdaq since the volume data includes interdealer trades (and only starts in 1982). Overall, we
consider a number of stocks ranging from 1056 to 3358, depending on the month. To correct for
survivorship bias, we adjust the returns for stock delisting (see Shumway (1997) and Acharya and
Pedersen (2005)).
There is a debate regarding which illiquidity measure is most appropriate. Hasbrouck
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(2009) shows that the Amihud (2002) measure has substantial cross-sectional correlation with
intraday price impact measures. Lou and Shu (2017) show that the cross-sectional relation
between equity returns and the Amihud measure is mainly due the volume component in the
Amihud measure. They question whether this volume premium is a liquidity premium. At the
same time, it is nontrivial to disentangle liquidity premiums from other potential effects of
volume. As standard models of trading and transaction costs predict, volume and more advanced
liquidity measures are empirically strongly correlated in the cross-section. Because of this, and to
make the comparison with Acharya and Pedersen (2005) as clean as possible, we follow their
approach when measuring liquidity and use the Amihud (2002) measure.
The relative illiquidity cost is thus computed as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The
starting point is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, which is defined as
(22) ILLIQi,t =
1
Daysi,t
Daysi,t
∑
d=1
∣∣Ri,t,d∣∣
Voli,t,d
for stock i in month t, where Daysi,t denotes the number of observations available for stock i in
month t, and Ri,t,d and Voli,t,d denote the return and trading volume in millions of dollars for stock
i on day d in month t, respectively.
We follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and define a normalized measure of illiquidity
that deals with non-stationarity and is a direct measure of trading costs, consistent with the model
specification. The normalized illiquidity measure can be interpreted as the dollar cost per dollar
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invested and is defined for asset i by
(23) ci,t = min
{
0.25%+0.30ILLIQi,tP
m
t−1,30.00%
}
,
where Pmt−1 is equal to the market capitalization of the market portfolio at the end of month t−1
divided by the value at the end of July 1962. The product with Pmt−1 makes the cost series ci,t
relatively stationary and the coefficients 0.30 and 0.25 are chosen as in Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) to match approximately the level and variance of ci,t for the size portfolios to those of the
effective half spread reported by Chalmers and Kadlec (1998). The value of normalized liquidity
ci,t is capped at 30% to make sure the empirical results are not driven by outliers.
As in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we construct 25 illiquidity portfolios. The portfolios
are formed on an annual basis. For these portfolios, we again require the stock price on the first
trading day of the corresponding month to be between $5 and $1000. For each portfolio, we
require at least 100 observations of the illiquidity measure in the previous year. We also construct
the value-weighted market portfolio and the value-weighted market-wide transaction costs on a
monthly basis.10
Table I and Figure 1 show the estimated average costs and average returns across the 25
illiquidity portfolios. The values correspond quite closely to those found in Table 1 of Acharya
10Acharya and Pedersen (2005) construct a market portfolio by equally weighting the 25 liquidity-sorted portfolios.
Our results are qualitatively similar when we use such an equal-weighted market portfolio. However, as Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2018) show, liquidity effects are strongest for small caps, and equal weighting puts a relatively high weight on
these small stocks. We thus use value-weighted portfolios and a value-weighted market portfolio in our benchmark
analysis.
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and Pedersen (2005). Most importantly, we see that average returns tend to be higher for illiquid
assets. Also, the table shows that returns on more illiquid portfolios are more volatile. This
finding holds for returns net of costs as well. The returns (net of costs) on more illiquid portfolios
tend to co-move more strongly with market returns (also net of costs).
In Table I we also provide for each portfolio the total market capitalization, averaged over
time, as a fraction of the total market capitalization. This is important for the estimation of our
model, since Proposition 1 uses the supply of each asset when solving for the equilibrium. Table I
shows, not surprisingly, that the market capitalization is lower for less liquid portfolios: the most
liquid portfolio represents 53.5% of the total equity market value. Together with Figure 1, this
implies that the liquidity premium mostly exists in stock portfolios with low market
capitalization. This is in line with the results of Hou et al. (2018), who show that the liquidity
premium is concentrated in small stocks.
V. Empirical Results
In this section, we take the model to the data. First, we estimate the parameters of the
model for a two-horizon model and compare it with single-horizon models (e.g., Acharya and
Pedersen, 2005). We also explore the implications of the estimates for the importance of the
different components of expected returns.
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A. Benchmark estimation results
Our benchmark estimation is based on two classes of investors. The first class (short
horizon) has an investment horizon h1 of 1 month, the second class (long horizon) has an
investment horizon h2 of 120 months (10 years). The choice for the length of the long horizon can
be compared with the estimate we obtain using the methodology of Atkins and Dyl (1997) for our
sample.11 Over the 1964–2009 period, we find an equal-weighted average holding period of 4.76
years (see Internet Appendix III.A).
Having set horizons, we then estimate the model parameters γ j = Q j/(A jS˜′ι) and, in some
cases, a constant term in the expected return equation (α). We denote the models with and
without a constant term as specifications (2HOR+α) and (2HOR), respectively. The role of the
constant term is to provide a specification check, because it should equal zero under the null
hypothesis. Table II shows the estimation results. We find that the model provides a very good fit
of the cross-section of the liquidity-sorted portfolio returns, with a cross-sectional R2 of 72.6%
without an intercept, and 74.1% with a constant term.12 The RMSE for the fit of the average
returns is about 7 basis points per month, which confirms the good fit.
The estimates in Table II can be used to obtain insight in the relative importance of long to
short-term investors as measured by their risk bearing capacity h jγ j. Without a constant term, the
11Atkins and Dyl (1997) find that the mean investor holding period for NYSE stocks during the period 1975–1989
is equal to 4.01 years.
12The R2 is defined as 1 – (residual variance / total variance). Here, the residual variance is the cross-sectional
variance of the model-implied minus observed average returns, and total variance is the cross-sectional variance of the
average portfolio returns.
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estimates imply that the risk-bearing capacity of short-term investors is about 14 times as large as
the capacity of long-term investors, with similar risk-bearing capacities when we add a constant
term. We thus see that both investor types contribute to the risk sharing in the economy, but
short-term investors are much more important. Table II also shows that the γ j-parameters are not
always estimated with great precision. This is due to the well-known estimation error in estimates
of expected returns, and because we also incorporate estimation errors in all sample estimates,
including average transaction costs and all covariances. Note also that we have fixed the horizons
of the investors ex-ante. If we were to estimate these horizons, this would affect the standard
errors of all parameters.
Next we focus on the optimal demands of the short-term and long-term investors in
equilibrium, obtained using Proposition 1. In panel A of Figure 2 we plot these demands for each
portfolio for the case without a constant term. For each portfolio, the demands add up to the share
of this portfolio in the total market portfolio. For example, the most liquid portfolio 1 contains
53.5% of the total market portfolio value, while the value of portfolio 25 equals 0.4% of the total
market portfolio. We see that the equilibrium generates almost full segmentation. Only 3
portfolios are held by both investors: portfolios 1, 14, and 15.13 Portfolios 2 to 12 are held
exclusively by the short-term investors, while portfolio 13 and the 10 least liquid stock portfolios
are held only by long-term investors. Panel B of Figure 2 presents the holdings as a fraction of the
total holdings of each investor. Note that, even though the holdings of the two investor types only
13To be precise, the short-term investor has positions of 52.29%, 0.06%, and 0.03% in portfolios 1, 14, and 15,
respectively. The long-term investor holds 1.20%, 1.16%, and 1.13% in these portfolios, respectively.
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overlap for three portfolios, their total investment returns will be substantially correlated because
of the return correlations across portfolios which may lead to substantial spillover effects.
We can use the examples in Section III.C to understand these results. As shown there, if
asset returns are highly correlated, an equilibrium with (almost) full segmentation may prevail,
because investors have limited interest in diversifying their wealth across assets. In our data, the
average pairwise return correlation of the 25 liquidity-sorted portfolios is equal to 0.84. Hence, by
investing in a few portfolios most of the diversification benefits have been achieved. The fact that
the long-term investor invests in the illiquid portfolios is then natural. That this investor also holds
the most liquid portfolio can be understood as follows. First, consider the analysis in Section II.C.
Here equations (9) and (10) show the conditions for including or not including an asset in the
optimal portfolio, both for short-term and long-term investors, in case of constant transaction
costs. Then, consider the most liquid portfolios 1 and 2. As shown in Table 1, these two portfolios
have similar transaction cost levels, but portfolio 1 has substantially lower risk, both in terms of
standard deviation and covariance with the market. Table 2 shows that the risk-bearing capacity
of the short-term investors is much higher than that of long-term investors. Thus, long-term
investors care more about the higher risk of portfolio 2 than short-term investors. Given that the
short-term investors will surely hold both portfolios 1 and 2 in equilibrium, because of their high
liquidity, they will set expected returns on these 2 portfolios (equation (9)). Given the high
risk-bearing capacity (“low risk aversion”) of the short-term investors, these investors will price
portfolio 2 at only a slightly higher expected return. However, the long-term investors, with their
lower risk-bearing capacity, require a much higher expected return for portfolio 2, and thus decide
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not to invest in portfolio 2. Portfolio 1, with its lower risk, is partially held by the long-term
investor: given its low risk and its liquidity premium, it improves the risk-return tradeoff of the
portfolio of the long-term investor.
We find almost the same optimal demands when we allow for a constant term in the asset
pricing model. In this case, the short-term investors hold portfolios 1 through 14, and the
long-term investors hold portfolio 1 and portfolios 14 to 25. Hence, portfolios 1 and 14 are held
by both investors.
The results in our paper imply that short-term (one-month) investors hold, in value terms,
88% of the total market, while long-term (ten-year) investors hold 12% of the market. The market
is fairly sharply segmented. The most illiquid stocks are held just by long term investors, and
most of the more liquid stocks are held just by short term investors. However, both types of
investor hold the most liquid stocks, those in portfolio 1, which accounts for about 50% of market
capitalization. The heterogeneity of investors’ horizons, and their associated demand for liquidity
is crucial to our model, and it is therefore important to review the empirical evidence for it.
The empirical evidence strongly supports the heterogeneity of investors on which our
model is based. We also find that average holding periods in our model are of the same order of
magnitude as those observed in practice, but we would not wish to put much weight on this. Our
model is designed to explain how the heterogenous demand for liquidity between investors affects
asset returns. It is not a model of trading behaviour. For tractability, we model demands for
liquidity by having our investors forced to liquidate their portfolios at some defined date, but there
are other reasons for demanding liquidity than having an ineluctable requirement to turn shares
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into cash. For example, open-end funds have to demonstrate that they can meet any likely demand
for withdrawals without harming remaining investors by being forced to sell assets at a discount
to market prices or by changing the risk profile of their portfolio (see Securities and Exchange
Commission (2016) for a fuller discussion on the liquidity management requirements on
open-end funds). This requirement forces funds to hold a more liquid portfolio than the one that
maximizes their expected net return. Furthermore, the demand by investors for index funds, and
the pressures on fund managers to track an index (Basak and Pavlova, 2013) will also increase
demand for liquid assets (which are over-represented in most indices) in a way that our model
does not capture.
The extension to our model provided in Section VI, which incorporates time series
variation in liquidity, predicts that when liquidity deteriorates, there is a shift of portfolios, with
long-horizon investors taking on some of the less liquid stocks held by short-horizon investors
and reducing their holdings of the most liquid securities. There is some evidence that this does
happen in practice. Ben-Rephael (2017) studies mutual fund behavior at times of financial crisis.
He shows that after a deterioration in market conditions there tend to be more retail investor
redemptions/withdrawals from mutual funds that hold illiquid stocks. Mutual fund managers as a
group therefore reduce their exposure to illiquid stocks. This sell-off is accommodated by two
types of institutional investor: those who hold large diversified portfolios and trade infrequently
and investors who trade aggressively on short-term information (respectively “Quasi-indexers”
and “Transient Investors” in the classification of Bushee (1998)).
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B. Comparison with single-horizon models
Does the two-horizon model improve upon single-horizon models? To answer this
question, we compare our model with two single-horizon models. The first model is the
single-horizon obtained by setting Q2 = 0 in equation (6). We choose h1, the single horizon of all
investors, by maximizing the R2 across horizons, which generates an optimal horizon of 16
months (no constant term) and 21 months (with a constant term). We then estimate the single
parameter γ1 (and a constant term in one specification) using GMM and denote the models by
1HOR and 1HOR+α.
The second, closely related, single-horizon model is the benchmark empirical
specification used by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Their setup has a one-period horizon
(h1 = 1) but allows for a slope coefficient κ on the expected liquidity term E [ct+1],
(24) E [Rt+1−1] = κE [ct+1]+ 1γ1 Cov(Rt+1− ct+1,R
m
t+1− cmt+1).
We denote these single-horizon specifications as (AP) and (AP+α) if we add the constant term.
Table II shows the estimation results for the 25 illiquidity-sorted portfolios. The 1HOR
and AP models generate very similar R2 values of 27.4% and 26.6%, respectively, both well
below the two-horizon model R2 of 72.6%. Table II also shows that the two-horizon model still
has a substantially higher R2 than the single-horizon models when we allow for a constant term α
in the asset pricing equation. It is important to keep in mind that we fixed the horizons in the
two-horizon model ex-ante. Robustness tests in Internet Appendix Section III.D show that the
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empirical results are similar with the long horizon set at 3 years or longer and the short horizon
set at 3 months or less. However, especially when we fix the short-term horizon at 6 months or
longer, the fit deteriorates.
In Figure 3 we plot the model-predicted expected returns against the observed average
returns across the 25 portfolios. These figures illustrate the much better fit of the two-horizon
model compared to the AP model. The observed average returns exhibit considerable variation
across the 25 portfolios, and panel A of Figure 3 shows that the AP model is not able to generate
and fit this variation. Panel B of Figure 3 shows that the two-horizon model obtains a much better
fit. We then investigate the source of the improved fit in more detail and use the empirical
estimates to decompose expected returns into an expected liquidity component and risk premium
component, according to Proposition 2. We depict this decomposition for the AP and two-horizon
model in Figure 4. We notice that in the single-horizon AP case, the impact of the expected
liquidity term is relatively modest. This is because the expected costs increase exponentially
when moving from liquid to illiquid portfolios, while the expected returns do not exhibit such an
exponentially increasing pattern (see Table I as well as Figure 1). If anything, the expected returns
increase with illiquidity at a lower rate for the more illiquid portfolios: the expected return levels
off after portfolio 19, but the expected liquidity term keeps rising. The AP specification implies a
linear relation between expected costs and expected returns, and thus has difficulty fitting the
cross-section of liquid versus illiquid portfolios. As a result, the expected liquidity effect is rather
small for the AP specification (a few basis points per month for most portfolios).
Due to the segmentation, the two-horizon model reduces the impact of the expected
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liquidity term on the illiquid portfolios relative to the impact on the liquid portfolios. In this way,
the model is able to allow for a much larger overall expected liquidity premium and this improves
the fit as shown in Figure 4. The average expected liquidity premium across portfolios is 4.58%
per year for the 2HOR specification, compared to an average effect of 0.73% per year for the AP
specification.
To understand the mechanisms of the two-horizon model in more detail, we study the
segmentation and spillover effects. The type of segmentation that we find empirically is slightly
more complex than in Section II.C.4, since some portfolios are held by short-term investors only,
some portfolios are held by both investors, and some portfolios are held by long-term investors
only. We can, however, follow the same reasoning as in Section II.C.4.14 We start with the
expected liquidity premium. Figure 5 shows, first of all, the expected liquidity premium that
would obtain in a full integration setting (equation (13)). In this case, the liquidity premium is
simply a constant times expected transaction costs. Next, we graph the impact of segmentation,
without spillover effects, by adding the second term in equation (16).15 These segmentation
effects increase the liquidity premium for portfolios 2 to 12, since these are held only by
short-term investors, while the effects are negative for portfolios 13 and 16 to 25, which are only
held by long-term investors. Finally, Figure 5 contains the total liquidity premium, which also
includes the spillover effects. We see that the spillover effects increase the liquidity premium for
14We again set Var(ct) = 0 to study these effects. As discussed in Section IV.C, this restriction is innocuous for our
application.
15To be precise, for portfolios i =2,..,12, which are only held by short-term investors, we add(
1
h1
− γ1+γ2γ1h1+γ2h2
)
E [ci,t+1] , while for portfolios 15 to 25, we add
(
1
h2
− γ1+γ2γ1h1+γ2h2
)
E [ci,t+1] . Portfolios 1, 14 and 15
are held by both investors and hence the segmentation effect is zero.
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portfolios 13 and 16 to 25, and decrease the liquidity premium for portfolios 2 to 12. This is
intuitive. Given that portfolios 2 to 12 are positively correlated with the portfolios that are held by
both short-term and long-term investors, the liquidity premium on portfolios 2 to 12 is dampened
to prevent long-term investors from buying these portfolios (instead of the illiquid portfolios).
Similarly, the spillover effect on portfolios 13 and 16 to 25 is positive to make sure that long-term
investors want to buy these portfolios.
Figure 5 also contains the segmentation and spillover effects for the risk premium.
Following the same approach as above, we start with the integration case (equation (17)). Then
we add the pure segmentation effect (equation (18)), which is strictly positive for all assets, and
more so for portfolios 13 and 16 to 25 since the risk-bearing capacity is smallest for the long-term
investors. Finally, adding the spillover effects we obtain the total risk premium in Figure 5. These
spillover effects are negative: due to the positive correlation among the portfolios, the effect of
segmentation is neutralized to a large extent. In sum, we see that both for the liquidity and risk
premiums the segmentation and spillover effects play an important role.
So far, we focused on comparing the economic fit of different models. We now turn to a
statistical test on whether the two-horizon model improves upon single-horizon models. Given
that the two-horizon model does not nest the single-horizon models, this is not trivial. We follow
Rivers and Vuong (2002) and Hall and Pelletier (2011) who derive a test statistic for comparing
two non-nested models that are estimated using GMM on the same set of moment conditions.
Their test statistic is given by the difference of the GMM J-values (equation (21)). If both models
are misspecified, in the sense that the expected J-value is strictly positive for both models, then
38
the difference between the J-values has an asymptotically normal distribution. This comparison
of misspecified models is similar to the approach of Hansen and Jagannathan (1997). In Internet
Appendix Section II.B we describe how we use a bootstrap procedure to obtain the asymptotic
variance of the test statistic. Given this variance, we can directly calculate a t-statistic given by
the difference between the J-values divided by the asymptotic standard deviation.
Comparing the two-horizon model with the AP single-horizon model, the t-statistic for the
test described above is equal to 1.64 if we exclude a constant term in the models, and 1.79 with a
constant term. Hence, based on this statistical test we can conclude only with moderate
confidence that the two-horizon model outperforms the single-horizon AP model.
C. Liquidity risk and robustness checks
Next we examine the role of liquidity risk in more detail. We do this by shutting down
liquidity risk: we take constant transaction costs, equal to the time-series average, throughout the
sample period, and assess how much model-implied expected returns change (keeping the
γ−parameters the same). This allows us to quantify the size of the liquidity risk premium implied
by our theoretical model. We find that the liquidity risk premium equals 2 basis points per year
(averaged across portfolios) and shutting down liquidity risk hardly affects the R2 of the model
(72.5% and 74.0%, without and with a constant term, respectively). This liquidity risk premium is
small for several reasons. First, consider the illiquid portfolios held by long-term investors.
Table I shows that these portfolios have substantial liquidity risk, but since the horizon of the
long-term investors is long they hardly care about this liquidity risk. Second, as shown in Table I,
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the portfolios held by short-term investors (portfolios 1 to 12, and 14 to 15) exhibit very small
liquidity risk. Hence, even though short-term investors do care about liquidity risk, the liquidity
risk premium remains negligible given that the risk itself is so small.
Of course, the reasoning above is within the restrictions imposed by the theoretical model.
It might be that liquidity risk does matter empirically, but that our model is not able to pick up this
effect. We therefore take the GMM fitting errors g(ψ̂, γ̂) of the 25 portfolios, and regress these on
the composite AP liquidity covariance (Cov(c,cm)−Cov(R,cm)−Cov(c,Rm)) . This allows us
to see if the two-horizon model can be improved by adding a separate liquidity risk component.
The results show this is not the case. Adding this additional covariance increases the R2 from
72.6% to 74.1% (and from 74.1% to 76.4% with a constant term), and the slope coefficient on this
liquidity covariance has a t-statistic of 0.49 (0.67 with constant term).
This confirms that the good fit of the two-horizon model is not obtained through the
liquidity risk channel, but rather via the expected liquidity effect and the associated spillover and
segmentation effects. This is an important finding, as existing work (Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003,
Sadka, 2006) often documents sizeable estimates for the liquidity risk premium. However, these
existing studies do not incorporate expected liquidity in their analysis. We show that the effect of
expected liquidity is large, especially once we allow for segmentation. Hence, our results suggest
that liquidity risk may be less important for pricing the cross-section of U.S. stocks than
previously thought. However, as noted by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), separating liquidity level
and liquidity risk premiums remains difficult given the strong relation between liquidity level and
risk.
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In Internet Appendix Section III we perform a wide range of robustness checks on these
empirical results. First, we show that the results are not very sensitive to the chosen horizons, as
long as the short-term horizon is 3 months or lower and the long-term horizon 3 years or longer.
Second, we use other portfolio sorts, including sorts on size and book-to-market, and double sorts
on the liquidity level and liquidity risk of stocks. Third, we split the sample in two. Fourth, we
use exactly the same sample period as Acharya and Pedersen (2005). In almost all these
robustness checks, the two-horizon generates a good fit to the average portfolio returns, and the fit
is substantially better than the single-horizon AP model. Only when we split the sample in two,
we find that for the second half of the sample both the two-horizon model and the AP model
generate a relatively low R2.
VI. Extension: Time-varying Liquidity Premiums
The theoretical model implies that liquidity premiums and risk premiums are constant
over time. In this section, we estimate an extended model that generates time variation in the
liquidity premium, and also allows for a time-varying degree of endogenous segmentation. We
achieve this by assuming two regimes for transaction costs.
A. A model with time-varying transaction costs
We introduce persistent transaction costs by allowing the level of transaction costs to
depend on a liquidity state It . Specifically, in the liquid state, defined by It = 0, transaction costs
41
are low with Ci,t =C0i +η
0
i,t , where η
0
i,t is a mean-zero, i.i.d. variable that captures variation in
transaction costs within the regime. Similarly, in the illiquid state (It = 1) we have
Ci,t =C1i +η1i,t , with C1i ≥C0i . The liquidity state follows a Markov-switching process.
Under additional assumptions, stated in Internet Appendix I.D, we obtain the following
asset pricing equation when transaction costs follow this Markov-switching process (setting
R f = 1 and h1 = 1 for notational purposes)
E [Rt+1−1 | It ] = (γ1V1,t + γ2h2V2,t)−1 γ1V1,tE [ct+1 | It ](25)
+(γ1V1,t + γ2h2V2,t)−1 Cov
(
Rt+1− ct+1,Rmt+1− cmt+1 | It
)
,
where
(26) V1,t = Var(Rt+1− ct+1 | It)Var(Rt+1− ct+1 | It)−1y1,t>0,p ,
and
(27) V2,t = h2Var(Rt+1− ct+1 | It)Var(h2Rt+1 | It)−1y2,t>0,p .
This expression for expected returns is very similar to the benchmark model (equation (6)), with
two important differences. First, all expectations and (co)variances are conditional on the
liquidity state. The model thus generates time variation in expected returns, driven by variation in
expected transaction costs, and variation in covariances of returns and transaction costs. Note that
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we allow for differences across regimes in both the level and variation of transaction costs.
The second difference with the benchmark model is that the degree of endogenous
segmentation may differ across regimes. The optimal demands in the two regimes can be
calculated using the conditional version of Proposition 1.16
B. Estimation approach: Time-varying transaction costs
To estimate the asset pricing model with time-varying transaction costs we first need to
identify liquidity regimes. To this end, we estimate a regime-switching model for the monthly
time series of the market-wide transaction cost level cmt , as constructed from the ILLIQi,t values
following equation (23). The main goal of this first step is to identify the regime at each point in
time, so that we can subsequently estimate the conditional expectations and covariances in
equation (25). Our specification follows the standard regime-switching approach,
cmt = c
0+δ0t+η0t , if It = 0(28)
cmt = c
1+δ1t+η1t , if It = 1
with η0t ∼N (0,σ20) and η1t ∼N (0,σ21). We thus allow both the mean and variance of the
market-wide transaction costs to differ across regimes, consistent with the assumptions in the
16An additional minor difference is that in the extended model the long-term investors do not contribute to the
expected liquidity premium. The term γ2h2V2 multiplying E [ct+1], which is present in the benchmark model, is absent
in the extended model. This is because we assume in this extended model that the horizon of long-term investors is
very long, so that transaction costs are not relevant for these investors.
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theoretical model discussed above. We also allow for a linear time trend in both regimes, captured
by the coefficients δ0 and δ1. This is to correct for trends in illiquidity over our sample period.
Finally, the regime-switching probabilities are assumed to be constant over time.
We estimate this model using the standard Maximum Likelihood procedure. In Table III
we present the estimation results. The results show a difference in the level of value-weighted
transaction costs across regimes, 0.31% versus 0.35%. As discussed below in more detail,
Figure 6 shows that for the less liquid portfolios the difference in transacion costs across regimes
is much larger. Importantly, the switching probabilities in Table III show that the regimes are
quite persistent. The probability of staying in the illiquid (liquid) regime equals 90.95%
(96.51%). This supports our focus in the theoretical model on the limit case where switching
probabilities tend to zero.
The Maximum Likelihood procedure also delivers an estimate of the prevalent regime at
each point in time t, P(It = 0 | ct ,ct−1, . . .), conditional upon all information at time t. In Internet
Appendix Section III.E we plot these probabilities and relate them to measures of financial and
economic stress, and find, as expected, that the probability of being in the liquid regime is lower in
times where these measures indicate adverse economic circumstances. We use these probabilities
to construct estimates of the conditional expectations and covariances of returns and transaction
costs for all portfolios. Specifically, if P(It = 0 | ct ,ct−1, . . .)> 0.5, the subsequent month t+1 is
assigned to the set of “liquid months”, and else it is assigned to the set of “illiquid months”. We
then calculate the means and covariances for the liquid months and illiquid months, respectively.
This gives sample estimates for E [Rt+1−1 | It ], E [ct+1 | It ], and all conditional covariances.
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Figure 6 plots the conditional mean returns and transaction costs across the 25 portfolios.
We see that for all portfolios transaction costs are higher in the illiquid regime, and more so for
the less liquid portfolios, which shows that the regime-switching model for market-wide
transaction costs captures liquidity regimes for all portfolios. We also calculate the composite
liquidity covariance (Cov(c,cm)−Cov(R,cm)−Cov(c,Rm)) in both regimes, and find that this
liquidity covariance is a factor 2.4 higher in the illiquid regime compared to the liquid regime
(averaged across portfolios). Hence, even though we construct the regimes based on transaction
cost levels, the regimes also exhibit changing liquidity risk. These results are similar to Watanabe
and Watanabe (2008), who find that liquidity betas are about 4 times higher in their regime with
high liquidity risk.
We see in Figure 6 that average returns are a bit lower for the illiquid regime. To
accommodate for this difference, we incorporate a constant term for the illiquid regime αIt=1 in
the conditional asset pricing model in equation (25). This way, we focus on explaining the
cross-sectional variation of expected returns in both regimes, rather than explaining why average
returns are mostly lower in the illiquid regime. Our empirical model thus becomes
E [Rt+1−1 | It ] = αIt=1+(γ1V1,t + γ2h2V2,t)−1 γ1V1,tE [ct+1 | It ](29)
+(γ1V1,t + γ2h2V2,t)−1 Cov
(
Rt+1− ct+1,Rmt+1− cmt+1 | It
)
.
In the estimation of the unconditional benchmark model, we focused on explaining
unconditional average returns across 25 portfolios sorted on illiquidity. Now, we have 50 moment
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conditions for the GMM estimation, as for each of the 25 portfolios we have an equation for the
conditional expected return in the liquid and illiquid regime.
The theoretical model allows both expectations and covariances of costs and returns to
differ across regimes. For our benchmark estimation, we focus on the variation in expected costs
and returns across regimes, and restrict all covariances to be the same across regimes. As
discussed below, this simplifies the interpretation of the results. In Internet Appendix
Section III.F we show that also allowing the covariances to differ across regimes does not change
the fit substantially and gives very similar results. We thus fill in all sample equivalents of the
(conditional) moments, using the classification of months into liquid versus illiquid, and then
estimate the conditional asset pricing model by applying GMM to the 50 moment conditions.
This gives estimates of the parameters γ1 and γ2.
C. Estimation results
In Table III we report the estimates. We find that the risk-bearing capacities γ jh j are quite
similar for the short-term and long-term investors, hence both investors are important for risk
sharing. The cross-sectional R2 equals 38.5%, which shows that the model provides a reasonable
fit to the cross-sectional variation in expected returns for both regimes, once we include a constant
term for the illiquid regime. Note that this is the R2 for the 50 conditional expected returns, and
hence this number cannot be compared directly with the unconditional case in Table II.
In Figure 2 we plot the optimal demand of the long-term investor in both regimes, as a
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fraction of total supply, obtained from the conditional version of Proposition 1. We see that in the
liquid regime the long-term investors hold portfolio 1 and 15 to 25. The long-term investor invests
in portfolio 1, thus accepting its relatively low expected return, because this portfolio delivers
diversification benefits for this investor. Moving to the illiquid regime, we see a flight-to-liquidity
effect: the long-term investor sells (part of) portfolio 1, and buys portfolio 13 and 14. This implies
that, when moving to the illiquid regime, the short-term investors are buying more of the most
liquid portfolio 1, and selling their least liquid portfolios 13 and 14. This effect can be understood
using the example in Section III.C. Specifically, equations (9) and (10) show when short-term
investors choose to invest in an asset or not. This depends both on transaction costs and return
covariances. To isolate the effect of higher transaction costs in the illiquid regime, we restrict the
covariances to be constant across regimes in our benchmark estimation. Then, equations (9) and
(10) tell us that, if transaction costs increase substantially when moving from the liquid to illiquid
regime, the short-term investor may stop investing in a given asset. This is exactly what we see in
our results. In Internet Appendix Section III.F we show the results for the case where we also
allow the covariances to change across regimes. We find a similar flight-to-liquidity effect in this
case.
We then calculate the expected liquidity premium. There are two opposing effects that
determine the expected liquidity premium across regimes. First, transaction costs are higher in the
illiquid regime, which increases the liquidity premium. Second, in the illiquid regime more
portfolios are held by the long-term investors who care less about liquidity, which decreases the
liquidity premium. Empirically, we find that the first effect dominates. Across all portfolios, the
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liquidity premium implied by our model equals 4.79% per year in the liquid regime, while it is
higher, at 4.90%, in the illiquid regime.
We also calculate the liquidity risk premium implied by the model, in the same way as
before: we shut down the time variation in transaction costs and recalculate the model-implied
expected returns. Even though we find that liquidity risk is higher in the illiquid regime, the
liquidity risk premium is 2.6 basis points per year in the illiquid regime and 1.4 basis point in the
liquid regime. This is because all assets with substantial liquidity risk are held by long-term
investors, who hardly care about this risk. This does not necessarily mean that our empirical
findings conflict with Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), who find a higher liquidity risk premium in
their illiquid regime. This is because, on a purely empirical basis, it is difficult to distinguish
expected liquidity and liquidity risk effects. Our structural model is thus helpful, as it puts
structure on the size of expected liquidity and liquidity risk premiums.
To validate the liquidity risk effects of the structural model, we perform the same analysis
as in Section IV.C. We calculate the composite liquidity beta of Acharya and Pedersen (2005),
where we allow this beta to differ across regimes, and perform a cross-sectional regression of the
residual pricing errors of the two-horizon model on this liquidity beta. Again, we find that
liquidity risk does not matter much. In fact, the coefficient on the liquidity beta is even
(counterintuitively) negative. The R2 increases from 38.5% to 44.6% when adding this negative
liquidity risk premium.
In sum, in this section we have shown that it is possible to extend the model to a setting
with regimes for transaction costs, and that our main empirical findings are unchanged: we
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continue to find that segmentation is important to fit the cross-section of expected returns, and we
again find evidence for a large expected liquidity premium. In addition, we obtain the intuitive
result that in illiquid times short-term investors reduce their investments in illiquid assets and
invest more in liquid assets.
VII. Conclusions
Heterogeneous demands for liquidity amongst investors, deriving from different
investment horizons, can have important asset pricing effects. Liquidity, as measured by trading
costs, varies widely across stocks and is valued very differently by short-term versus long-term
investors. We present a new liquidity-based asset pricing model with investors with
heterogeneous investment horizons and stochastic transaction costs. Our model contributes to the
literature by effectively combining the clientele of investors in the Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
paper with the risk-averse agents and stochastic illiquidity of the Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
model. The increased generality of our model delivers a number of new theoretical insights. In
equilibrium, investors may choose to hold only a subset of the assets, depending on the liquidity
and risk-return profile of each asset. This endogenous segmentation has an effect on the expected
liquidity premium and risk premiums, and the size of these segmentation effects depends on the
correlation between segmented and integrated assets.
We estimate our model on the cross-section of U.S. stock returns, and find it generates a
good fit to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolio returns. The main reason for the good fit
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is the interaction between the expected liquidity premium and segmentation effects. Two aspects
of the empirical results are particularly striking. First, our model generates a much larger
expected liquidity premium than previous work. Second, our estimates imply a negligible
liquidity risk premium. Once we allow for segmentation and multiple horizons, we obtain a good
fit of the cross-section of liquidity-sorted equity portfolios even when we shut down liquidity risk.
There are several interesting extensions to our work. A natural extension of our paper
would be to model investor horizons, so that one could jointly test for a better fit on returns,
investor holding periods, and the portfolio weights of investors with these horizons. Development
of a more sophisticated modelling of liquidity demand, going beyond the simple imposition of a
fixed liquidation horizon, and a more nuanced measure of liquidity than the bid-ask spread, could
help refine and deepen our understanding of the pricing of liquidity. Making liquidity endogenous
would also be an important step forward, as the trading behavior of short-term and long-term
investors is likely to influence liquidity and the relation between returns and liquidity. On the
empirical side, it would be interesting to study the pricing of different asset classes using our
model. For example, our model has predictions on the liquidity premiums in private equity.
Private equity is usually less liquid than public equity, but the correlation between their returns is
substantial, which affects the liquidity premiums according to our model.
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Table II
Benchmark estimation results: Illiquidity-sorted portfolios
This table shows the estimation results for various model specifications. The estimates are based on monthly data
corresponding to 25 value-weighted US stock portfolios sorted on illiquidity with sample period 1964–2009. An
equal-weighted market portfolio is used. The parameters are estimated using GMM. For each coefficient the t-value
is given in parentheses. The cross-sectional R2 and root mean squared error (RMSE) are also reported, as well as
the risk-bearing capacity of investors with a given horizon (γ jh j). The first model is a two-horizon model ((6)), with
h1 = 1, and h2 = 120, without and with a constant term α (2HOR and 2HOR+α). AP indicates that the specification
corresponds to a variant of the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) specification given by equation (24), where κ is the slope
coefficient on expected liquidity. Finally, estimates for a single-horizon model are given (setting Q2 = 0 in equation
(6)), with the horizon h1 chosen to maximize the R2, which gives h1 = 16 without constant, and h1 = 21 with constant.
γ1 γ2 α κ R2 RMSE γ1h1 γ1h2
(2HOR) 0.70398 0.00045 72.6% 0.075% 0.70398 0.05334
(1.30) (1.31)
(2HOR+α) 0.70941 0.00034 0.004% 74.1% 0.073% 0.70941 0.04065
(4.18) (2.51) (0.00)
(AP) 0.32636 0.05305 26.6% 0.122% 0.32636
(2.62) (2.10)
(AP+α) -0.47145 1.007% 0.04184 32.3% 0.117% -0.47145
(-0.43) (1.06) (1.64)
(1HOR) 0.02091 27.4% 0.122% 0.33457
(2.63)
(1HOR+α) 0.04118 0.359% 29.0% 0.120% 0.87727
(3.12) (0.92)
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Table III
Estimation results: Regime-switching model
This table shows the estimation results for the dynamic version of the model (Section VI), as well as the regime-
switching model that generates the regimes. The estimates are based on monthly data corresponding to 25 value-
weighted US stock portfolios sorted on illiquidity with sample period 1964–2009. An equal-weighted market portfolio
is used. Panel A reports estimation results for ML estimation of the regime-switching model in equation (28),
cmt = c
0+δ0t+η0t , if It = 0,(A1)
cmt = c
1+δ1t+η1t , if It = 1,
which specifies the dynamics of market-wide transaction costs. Panel B reports the regime-switching probabilities
of the regime-switching model. Panel C reports GMM estimates of the asset pricing model with two regimes for
transaction costs, as given in equation (29), with a constant term for the expected returns in the illiquid regime, and
where we allow transaction costs to differ across regimes, but restrict variances and covariances of returns and costs
to be the same across regimes. We set h1 = 1, and h2 = 120. For each portfolio, we have two moment conditions:
the mean return in the illiquid regime and the mean return in the liquid regime. The parameters are estimated using
GMM. For each coefficient the t-value is given in parentheses. The cross-sectional R2 and RMSE are also reported, as
well as the risk-bearing capacities (γ jh j).
Panel A: Regime-switching estimates
Liquid regime Illiquid regime
c 0.311% 0.350%
(47.27) (24.00)
δ (annualized) -0.0014% -0.0007%
(14.56) (7.85)
Panel B: Regime-switching probabilities
From / To Liquid regime Illiquid regime
Liquid regime 96.51% 3.49%
Illiquid regime 9.05% 90.95%
Panel C: GMM estimates of conditional asset pricing model
γ1 γ2 αIt=1 R2 RMSE γ1h1 γ2h2
0.68818 0.00033 -0.2401% 38.5% 0.167% 0.68818 0.04004
(2.08) (0.89) (-0.58)
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Figure 1. Average returns and transaction costs
This figure illustrates the average monthly return (left axis) and average transaction costs (right
axis) for the 25 US stock portfolios sorted on illiquidity. Portfolio 1 is the most liquid portfolio,
while portfolio 25 is the least liquid portfolio.
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Figure 2. Optimal portfolio holdings of investors
This figure gives, for each of the 25 equity portfolios sorted on transaction costs, the optimal
holdings of short-term (1-month) and long-term (120 months) investors for the benchmark two-
horizon model in Table II (without constant term). These holdings are obtained using Proposition 1,
and are presented as a fraction of total supply of the value-weighted market portfolio in panel A,
and as a fraction of the total holdings of each investor in panel B.
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Figure 3. Predicted versus observed returns
The upper panel plots the model-implied expected returns for the Acharya and Pedersen (2005)
specification (AP), across the 25 liquidity-sorted portfolios, against the observed average returns.
The lower panel plots the model-implied expected returns for the two-horizon model (2HOR),
across the 25 liquidity-sorted portfolios, against the observed average returns.
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Figure 4. Decomposition of expected excess returns into the expected liquidity premium and
the risk premium
In each panel the lower part shows the expected liquidity premium and the upper part the risk
premium following Proposition 2. The line indicates the actual average excess return. The upper
panel shows the decomposition for the Acharya and Pedersen (2005) specification (AP). The lower
panel shows the decomposition for the two-horizon model (2HOR). The graphs correspond to the
estimation results as given in Table II.
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Figure 5. Segmentation and spillover effects
Panel A of this figure gives, for each of the 25 equity portfolios sorted on transaction costs, ex-
pected liquidity premiums implied by the benchmark two-horizon model with h1 = 1 and h2 = 120
(Table II, without constant term). First, the liquidity premium in case of integration (equation (13))
is plotted (for portfolios 24 and 25 the premium is 3.2% and 5.8%, respectively). Then, segmen-
tation effects are added to this premium (as discussed in Section IV.B). Finally, the total liquidity
premium generated by the model is given, thus also including spillover effects. Panel B provides
the same effects, but now for the risk premium.
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Figure 6. Average returns and transaction costs across regimes
This figure illustrates the average monthly return (top panel) and average transaction costs (bottom
panel) for the 25 U.S. stock portfolios sorted on illiquidity. Portfolio 1 is the most liquid portfolio,
while portfolio 25 is the least liquid portfolio. Each graph shows the values in the liquid regime
and the illiquid regime, obtained from estimation of the regime switching model (28).
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Figure 7. Optimal portfolio holdings in different regimes
This figure gives, for each of the 25 equity portfolios sorted on transaction costs, the optimal
holdings of long-term (120 months) investors for the dynamic two-horizon model in Table III, both
in the liquid regime and the illiquid regime. These holdings are obtained using Proposition 1 for
each regime, and are presented as a fraction of total supply of the value-weighted market portfolio.
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